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*  Abstract
To make unbiased decisions about whether to pursue a fleeing vehicle, officers
must understand both the costs and the potential benefits of a pursuit. This manu-
script describes an approach that identifies and assesses the impact of pursuit
characteristics on pursuit costs. Data from official pursuit forms generated by
officers in the Miami-Dade police department were used as a basis of the study.
Log-linear models were used to identify direct and interactive effects of the pur-
suit characteristics. Upon finding significant effects, odds ratios were calculated.
The findings indicate that there are certain pursuit characteristics, including num-
ber of units and speed, that significantly increase the likelihood of pursuits re-
sulting in a cost to society including personal injury or property damage.
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Police officers have the discretion to stop drivers for traffic and other violations.
In the majority of cases, the driver will obey the police officer’s order. Unfortu-
nately, not all suspects stop when signaled. Therefore, whether to pursue a flee-
ing suspect is a decision many, if not all, officers must eventually face. Police
pursuits generate a benefit to society when they result in an arrest, but at what
cost?  The cost of a pursuit can be exorbitant. The generally accepted estimate is
that 40% of all pursuits result in a crash, 20% involve personal injury, and 1%
result in a death. Strong supporters of pursuits believe pursuits are justified for
any offense, including traffic violations (California Highway Patrol, 1983;
Hannigan, 1992). These supporters argue that unless suspects are aggressively
chased, they and others will likely flee the police, which will result in havoc on
the roadways. Further, they believe the decision to engage in the pursuit and the
ongoing decision of whether to continue the pursuit should be made by the of-
ficer in the field.
Alternatively, some police departments have created more restrictive pursuit
policies (Kenney & Alpert, 1997), limiting pursuits to those of a known or sus-
pected violent felon who will pose a serious threat to the public if not appre-
hended immediately (Alpert, 1997). In some cases, family members of people
injured in a pursuit have suggested a total ban on pursuits, and the city of Balti-
more has had a no-chase policy for more than 20 years.1
The most prudent pursuit decision is not dichotomous, chase versus no chase,
but one that weighs the benefits of a pursuit against the costs. The goal of this
manuscript is to contribute to the development of a “pursuit calculus”; that
is, given certain pursuit characteristics, what are the odds that the pursuit will
result in damage or injury?  These odds must be weighed against the benefits
of apprehension.
* Development of a Decision Calculus
As long as there are police officers who are determined to catch fleeing sus-
pects, pursuits are inevitable. The goal of police administration with respect to
pursuits is to maximize the benefit (apprehension of serious criminals) while
1 In a report in the Boston Herald (May 18, 1998), the grandmother of a young man
killed as a result of a high-speed chase in Falmouth, MA, said she planned to petition the
state legislature to ban all pursuits. Officers involved in the pursuit stated that they termi-
nated the pursuit minutes after beginning the chase. However, members of the community
reported that they heard on police scanners that the pursuit lasted 45 minutes.
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minimizing the cost (damage or injury). Individual departments, either formally
or informally, need to develop a procedure that can identify when pursuits should
be initiated, continued, or terminated. These decisions must be based on both the
benefits and the costs. Without incorporating the element of cost, the decision of
whether or not to pursue will be based only on the potential benefit, which may
induce an error in judgement. Arkes (1991) describes three categories of judg-
mental biases: strategy-based errors, association-based errors, and psychophysi-
cally based errors. Figure 1 depicts the value function of Prospect Theory, a theory
concerned with the process of making decisions under risk (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), used by Arkes to describe the sunk cost effect. This is one example of a
psychophysically based judgment error.
* Sunk Cost Effect
Decisions should be based on the anticipated benefits and costs that will result
from a particular choice. Future costs or benefits are relevant; prior (sunk) costs
are not. When sunk costs are used in making a decision, an error in judgment is
made. In Figure 1, people who have already invested substantial amounts and
have not yet realized compensatory returns would be located at point B.
People in this situation are not very sensitive to future losses. They will take
more risk than they normally would to recoup their sunk costs. For example, a
person who started with $150 at the racetrack and lost $140 may consider the
$140 a sunk cost. This person may consider betting $10 on a 15:1 long shot in
the last race. There are two ways to frame the decision: status quo and sunk cost.
For the status quo frame, only future benefits and losses are considered. Weigh-
ing the possible gain of $140 against the possible loss of $10, the person would
be located at Point 0 in Figure 1, the intersection of the axes. The sunk cost
framing context views the present state as a loss of $140 (point B) and the deci-
*   Figure 1
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sion is between returning to the reference point 0 or increasing the loss to $150
(Point A). Prospect Theory predicts that the sunk cost framing context would
produce more risk-seeking behavior than the status quo framing context. Indi-
viduals who do not modify their point of reference as they lose are likely to make
bets they would not make under normal circumstances.
Consider the police officer who has been involved in a pursuit for a period of
time. What is influencing the decision to continue the pursuit, the future benefits
versus future costs, or the sunk costs of pursuing for a length of time without the
satisfaction of apprehending the driver?  Would an officer without the sunk cost
make the same decision to continue the pursuit as an officer experiencing sunk
cost?  It must be remembered that police pursuits are not static events. They may
start in a noncongested area and travel into a congested area, they increase in
speed, road conditions change, etc. Police officers need to update the pursuit
conditions in terms of both benefits and costs to make an unbiased decision
about whether to continue a pursuit.
The contribution of Prospect Theory is that unlike the expected utility model
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), it accounts for context effects on individual
choice under risk. The simple framing of a decision in terms of gains or losses
can affect choice, which raises an interesting question for police pursuits: would
the choice to pursue be different if the decision were framed in terms of gains
(no injury) versus losses (no apprehension)?  The research underlying the devel-
opment of Prospect Theory indicates that people are risk averse when the deci-
sion is framed in terms of gains, and risk takers when the decision is framed in
terms of losses.
* Costs of Police Pursuits
Alpert and Fridell (1992) report the generally accepted figure that approximately
40% of all pursuits result in damage. The question that needs an answer is whether
there are certain environmental characteristics of a pursuit, such as high speed,
number of units, time of day, area of pursuit, etc., that increase the odds of a
pursuit resulting in damage or injury.
Research on pursuit driving has progressed from descriptive studies (Fennessy,
Hamilton, Joscelyn & Merrit, 1970) to statistical models designed to assess the
impact of the pursuit environment on the decision to pursue (Alpert, 1997; Alpert
& Madden, 1996; Crew & Fridell, 1994). The most comprehensive literature
review on police pursuits is provided by Alpert and Fridell (1992). Only a limited
number of studies provide information on specific costs and benefits of pursuits.
Auten (1994a) estimates the average cost of a pursuit which ends in a crash at
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$28,500 (Auten, 1994a; Auten, 1994b, p. 76).2   Crew, Fridell and Pursell (1995)
report that 38% of the pursuits initiated for a traffic violation result in a crash.
The pursuits that have the greatest likelihood of resulting in personal injury or
death are pursuits of suspected felons and DUI (17% and 14%, respectively).
The policing community and the research literature have frequently based the
costs of a pursuit on the broad measures of an accident, injury, or death (Alpert
& Fridell, 1992).
Figure 2 presents a hypothetical value function for four possible offenses:
traffic violation (T), property damage (PD), felony (F), and violent felony (VF).
The hypothetical value function is specified as nonlinear. The marginal value
increases for the apprehension of more serious violations. On the one hand, all
apprehensions have a positive value, and all pursuits would be authorized if only
2 This estimate did not include legal costs, costs of agency time spent investigating the
accident or possible policy violations, overtime, or time off for injuries.
*   Figure 2
Pursuit Value Function
benefits were influencing the decision. On the other hand, pursuits also have
costs. The higher the risk factors, the greater the chance of injury. In the present
example, there are three pursuit profiles in which the likelihood of injury is a
function of the pursuit risk factors. These are labeled as Profiles A, B, and C in
Figure 3. Profile A has the lowest risk of injury, whereas profile C has the high-
est risk of injury. If the risk of injury were characterized by profile A, all pursuits
would be authorized. If the risk of personal injury were at level B in Figure 3,
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risks of the pursuit, however, outweigh the potential benefits of  stopping a driver
for a traffic violation or a property damage violation. The pursuit of a violent
felon would be authorized for any of the risk factors present in Figure 3. The
potential benefits are greater than the potential costs for any of the pursuit profiles.
If pursuits have no costs, then all suspects should be pursued. Without costs
the aggressive supporters of pursuits (California Highway Patrol, 1983; Hannigan,
1992) are correct. However, there are costs, and in some cases very severe costs,
including the loss of life. A pursuit decision calculus may accentuate the circum-
stances under which these strong pursuit supporters should modify their philoso-
phy in the interest of public safety.
To quantify the costs and benefits of a pursuit, Crew et al. (1995) created a
“pursuit trade-off ratio.”  The ratio compares the odds of apprehension to the
odds of a pursuit resulting in injury or death. While the pursuit trade-off ratio
relates benefits to costs, it does not identify specific factors contributing to the
likelihood of damage or injury. The first step in the development of a pursuit
decision calculus is to identify the characteristics most  associated with damage
or injury, and then estimate the impact or change in the likelihood of damage or
injury when the factors are present.
* The Pursuit Decision Calculus
Data used in this study represent the aggregated official pursuit reports from the
Miami-Dade Police Department (Florida) between the years of 1990 and 1994.
This agency has been concerned about the problems associated with pursuits and
has instituted exemplary policies, training, supervision, and accountability sys-
tems. Therefore, these data may not be generalizable to other agencies, but they
do show how a pursuit calculus can assist law enforcement.
*   Figure 3
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Variable               Level                          Count                          Percent
Damage Yes 240 25.5
No 701 74.5
Injury Yes 192 20.4
No 749 79.6
Units One 620 65.9
Twoa 321 34.1
Daylight Yes 297 31.6
No 644 68.4
Reason Traffic 427 45.4
Otherb 514 54.6
Area Commercial 289 30.7
Residential 652 69.3
Speed <65 721 76.6
66+ 220 23.4
a Two or more units
b All offenses (e.g., DUI, car theft, assault) other than a simple traffic violation
*   Table 1
Frequency Distributions for Pursuit Costs and Pursuit Characteristics
The database contains 1,049 recorded pursuits. The pursuit reports indicate,
among other things, whether the pursuit resulted in property damage or personal
injury. In this database, 25.5% of the pursuits resulted in property damage and
20.4% resulted in personal injury. These two pursuit outcomes, damage and
injury, served as the criterion variables for the analyses. The environmental fac-
tors chosen to model the costs are: the geographical area where the pursuit took
place (area); the reason the pursuit was initiated (reason); number of units in the
pursuit (units); time of day the pursuit was initiated (time); and the top speed of
the pursuit (speed). Weather and road conditions were not included in the analy-
sis because of very small variance; less than 5% of the pursuits took place on wet
roads or in poor weather conditions. The elapsed time of the pursuit was also not
included in the analyses because the majority of the forms were missing that infor-
mation. The frequencies for these pursuit characteristics are reported in Table 1.3
3 These are not the only factors that should be considered when estimating the costs
of a pursuit  Other variables, if  available, could be included in the model.
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* Analytical Approach
Since the criterion variables, personal injury and property damage, are categori-
cal, as are many of the exogenous variables, log-linear models were selected to
assess and statistically test the relationships between an endogenous variable and
the exogenous variables. As a brief review of the use of log-linear models, con-
sider the case in which the effects of two exogenous variables, Bj and Ck, on an
endogenous variable Ai, where i=j=k=1,2, are assessed. One analytical alterna-
tive is to cross-tabulate each of the exogenous variables, Bj and Ck, with the
endogenous Ai. For example, cross-tabulation of the variables units and speed on
outcome would test for the main effects of Bj and Ck on Ai; however, the tech-
nique ignores any effect of the interaction of BCjk on Ai.
To assess the statistical significance of main effects and higher order effects
of the exogenous variables upon a criterion variable, the partial association test,
which is based on the likelihood ratio statistic, is used. The likelihood ratio sta-
tistic, which is similar to the traditional c2 square statistic, can be used to test
how well a hypothesized model fits observed data. And, in addition, the likeli-
hood ratio statistic can be used to test differences between nested models. For the
case of the three variables Ai, Bj, and Ck, the saturated model–the model includ-
ing all main effects and higher order interactions–would be:
(1) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + ACik + BCjk + ABCijk
The saturated model will always perfectly fit the data; there are no degrees of
freedom. To test for specific effects, hierarchical models nested within the satu-
rated model are  specified. For this example with three variables, the set of hier-
archical models for the interactive effects would be:
(2) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + ACik + BCjk + ABCijk
(3) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + ACik + BCjk
(4) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + ACik
(5) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + BCjk
(6) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ACik + BCjk
If, for example, interest centered on testing the significance of the interaction
between Ai and Ck, the following models could be fit:
(7) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + ACik + BCjk, and
(8) Yijk = Ai + Bj + Ck + ABij + BCjk
These two models form a nested hierarchy; model 8 is nested within model 7.
Notice the only difference between the two models is whether the interaction of
interest, ACik, is included. For each model, the likelihood ratio statistic, denoted
as L2, is calculated as a measure of how well the model fits the data. Therefore L2
(7) is the likelihood ratio statistic for model 7 and L2 (8) is the likelihood ratio
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statistic for model 8. It can be shown (Dillon & Goldstein, 1984) that L2 (8)
and L2 (7) are asymptotically c2 with V8 and V7 degrees of freedom, respec-
tively. It can also be shown that L2 (8) – L2 (7) is  asymptotically c2 with V8 –
V7 degrees of freedom. The difference in the likelihood ratio statistics can be
used to test the hypothesis HO: ACik = 0. If the interaction between Ai and Ck
is significant, then there will be a significant difference between the fit of the
model containing the ACik effect and the model that does not contain the
effect. The next section of the paper shows the results of using log-linear
models to calculate the partial association between the characteristics of a
pursuit and the cost of the pursuit.
* Results
The partial chi-square tests for the effects containing the criterion variable
personal injury and one or more of the pursuit background characteristics
are provided in Table 2. Table 3 contains the partial association tests for
property damage.
Personal Injury
The four-way interaction among number of units, reason for pursuit, area
of pursuit and speed was statistically significant (p = .04), as was the two-way
interaction between units and time (p = .04). Three of the pursuit characteris-
tics–units, area and speed–had a statistically significant direct effect on the like-
lihood of personal injury. The odds ratios for the direct effects are shown in
Table 4. When more than one unit is involved, the odds of personal injury are
2.03 to 1 compared to a pursuit with only one police unit. The odds of personal
injury are 1.75 more likely in a commercial area versus a residential area, and
1.78 times more likely when the speed of the pursuit exceeds 65 miles per hour.
Whenever a pursuit involves more than one unit, is in a commercial area, or has
speeds in excess of 65 mph, the likelihood of the pursuit resulting in personal
injury increases.
To assess the odds of personal injury for statistically significant interactions
between or among two or more of the pursuit characteristics, a  multiway table
composed of the pursuit characteristics was formed. The odds ratios are then
calculated for each cell of the multiway table. Table 5 presents the odds of injury
for the interaction between the number of units and the light conditions. When
more than one unit is involved in a pursuit, the odds of personal injury are 2.03
to 1 (see Table 4). The data in Table 5 show that the lighting conditions of the
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*   Table 2
Partial Association Tests for Personal Injury
Effect            Df    χ2          p-value
Units Time Reason Area 1 0.159 .69
Units Time Reason Speed 1 1.652 .12
Units Time Area Speed 1 0.000 .98
Units Reason Area Speed 1 4.180 .04
Time Reason Area Speed 1 0.092 .76
Units Time Reason 1 0.272 .60
Units Time Area 1 0.028 .87
Units Reason Area 1 0.131 .72
Time Reason Area 1 0.244 .62
Units Time Speed 1 0.070 .79
Units Reason Speed 1 0.140 .71
Time Reason Speed 1 0.000 .99
Units Area Speed 1 2.593 .11
Time Area Speed 1 0.082 .77
Reason Area Speed 1 0.163 .69
Units Time 1 4.296 .04
Units Reason 1 0.144 .70
Time Reason 1 0.410 .52
Units Area 1 0.019 .89
Time Area 1 2.378 .12
Reason Area 1 3.140 .08
Units Speed 1 1.359 .24
Time Speed 1 1.930 .16
Reason Speed 1 0.098 .75
Area Speed 1 0.029 .87
Units 1 15.706 .00
Time 1 0.057 .81
Reason 1 0.189 .66
Area 1 6.245 .01
Speed 1 5.238 .02
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*   Table 3
Partial Association Tests for Property Damage
Effect            Df    χ2          p-value
Units Time Reason Area 1 1.371 .24
Units Time Reason Speed 1 0.250 .62
Units Time Area Speed 1 2.449 .12
Units Reason Area Speed 1 0.261 .61
Time Reason Area Speed 1 0.088 .77
Units Time Reason 1 0.799 .37
Units Time Area 1 0.206 .65
Units Reason Area 1 1.404 .24
Time Reason Area 1 4.595 .03
Units Time Speed 1 0.049 .82
Units Reason Speed 1 0.373 .54
Time Reason Speed 1 6.781 .0
Units Area Speed 1 0.878 .35
Time Area Speed 1 0.281 .60
Reason Area Speed 1 0.288 .59
Units Time 1 0.064 .80
Units Reason 1 9.536 .00
Time Reason 1 3.156 .08
Units Area 1 0.011 .92
Time Area 1 0.285 .59
Reason Area 1 0.825 .36
Units Speed 1 1.666 .20
Time Speed 1 0.937 .33
Reason Speed 1 1.410 .24
Area Speed 1 1.853 .17
Units 1 0.031 .86
Time 1 0.273 .60
Reason 1 0.755 .38
Area 1 3.193 .07
Speed 1 0.222 .64
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pursuit moderate the direct effect of the number of units. During daylight condi-
tions, when more than one unit is involved, the odds of injury are 3.88 to 1. At
night the odds of injury are 1.55 to 1. Consistent results are found when number
of units is specified as the moderating variable. The odds of injury for day rather
than night conditions is greatest when more than one unit is involved in the pursuit.
Table 6 provides estimates for the likelihood of personal injury for the four-
way interactions among speed, area, reason, and units involved in a pursuit.
       Odds Ratio                             Odds of Injury
Twoa versus one unit ..................................... 2.03
Commercial versus Residential area .............. 1.75
Fastb versus slow speed .................................. 1.78
a Two or more units
b Speeds in excess of 65 mph
*   Table 4
Odds of Personal Injury for the Direct Effects of Units, Area, and Speed
*   Table 5
Odds of Personal Injury for the Interaction Between Number of Units
and Time of Pursuit
Odds Ratio Moderator                              Odds of Injury
Light Conditions
Twoa versus one unit Daylight 3.85
 Night 1.55
Units
Day versus night One 0.60
Two 1.45
a Two or more units
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*   Table 6
Odds of Personal Injury for the Interaction Among Number of Units,
Reason for the Pursuit, Area of the Pursuit, and Speed of the Pursuit
Odds Ratio Moderators     Odds of Injury
Units Reason Area
Fasta versus slow One Traffic Commercial 2.39
One Traffic Residential 1.88
One Non-traffic Commercial 0.74
One Non-traffic Residential 3.50
Twob Traffic Commercial 0.72
Two Traffic Residential 1.38
Two Non-traffic Commercial 2.27
Two Non-traffic Residential 0.71
Units Reason Speed
Commercial versus One Traffic Slow 1.06
 residential One Traffic Fast 1.34
One Non-traffic Slow 3.50
One Non-traffic Fast 0.74
Two Traffic Slow 1.56
Two Traffic Fast 0.82
Two Non-traffic Slow 1.17
Two Non-traffic Fast 3.72
Units Area Speed
Non-traffic versus One Commercial Slow 1.94
 traffic One Commercial Fast 0.60
One Residential Slow 0.58
One Residential Fast 1.09
Two Commercial Slow 0.82
Two Commercial Fast 2.58
Two Residential Slow 1.09
Two Residential Fast 0.57
Reason Area Speed
Two versus one unit Traffic Commercial Slow 2.78
Traffic Commercial Fast 0.84
Traffic Residential Slow 1.88
Traffic Residential Fast 1.38
Non-traffic Commercial Slow 1.17
Non-traffic Commercial Fast 2.58
Non-traffic Residential Slow 3.50
Non-traffic Residential Fast 0.71
a Speeds in excess of 65 mph        b Two or more units
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Each of the four sections of the table demonstrates the odds of injury for one
factor given the eight profiles specified by the other three factors. For example,
the data in the first section provide the odds of injury for pursuits that exceed
65 miles per hour for all of the possible combinations of pursuits created by the
other three factors. Since the other factors each have two levels, there are eight
profiles. The benefits from investigating the higher order interactions are evi-
dent in the first section of the table. The odds of injury, in general, are greater
when there is more than one unit. The data in Table 4 show the odds of injury
are 2.03 to 1 when more than one unit is involved in the pursuit. From Table 6
we can see that the highest odds of injury from a pursuit that exceeds 65 miles
per hour occur when one unit is involved in a pursuit for a reason other than a
traffic violation in a residential area.
The second section of Table 6 compares the odds of injury when the pursuit
takes place in a commercial area rather than a residential area. Here the greatest
odds of injury occur when more than one unit is involved at speeds in excess of
65 mph for an offense other than a traffic violation. The odds of injury for the
profile created by one unit for a violation other than a traffic violation at speeds
under 65 mph are also high (3.5:1). This seems counterintuitive given the results
in the first section of this table. However, upon a closer examination of the data,
the results are consistent. The odds of injury when the pursuit is in a residential
area are .1 to 1, and .35 to 1 when in a commercial area. Therefore, the odds are
3.5 to 1 when going from a residential to commercial area. The high odds are
more a result of the low likelihood of injury for pursuits under 65 mph in a
residential area.
The third section of Table 6 compares the odds of injury when a pursuit
results for a reason other than a traffic violation compared to pursuits for traffic
violations. There is little difference in the odds ratios. Only two comparisons
show odds much greater than even. The odds of injury are 2.5 to 1 for pursuits
involving more than one unit at speeds in excess of 65 mph in a commercial
area, and 1.94 to 1 for pursuits involving one unit in a commercial area at
speeds less than 65 mph. The other six profiles are either close to 1 to 1 or less
than 1 to 1. The reason for the pursuit interacts with the other pursuit charac-
teristics, as seen in the other sections of this table, but does not have a direct
effect on the likelihood of injury.
The fourth section of Table 6 provides the odds of injury when the pur-
suit involves more than one unit compared to pursuits with only one unit
involved. The results of the eight comparisons are consistent with the main
effects shown in Table 4. In general, the odds of injury increase when more
than one unit is involved. The greatest odds of injury when more than one
unit is involved are for pursuits in a residential area at speeds less than 65
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mph for a reason other than a traffic violation. The odds of injury are actu-
ally less for the same profile except when the speeds are greater than 65
mph. The reason for this is the same as described for the second section of
Table 6: the odds in the residential area are low.
Property Damage
Pursuit characteristics have no direct effect upon the outcome of property
damage. However, two of the three-way interactions were significant (p < .05),
and one of the two-way interactions was significant (See Table 3). The odds
ratios for the interaction between the reason for the pursuit and the number of
units with property damage are provided in Table 7. Inspection of the odds ratios
shows no pattern of property damage as a result of the reason for the pursuit or
number of units in the pursuit. For example, when two or more units versus one
unit are involved for a traffic violation, the odds are 1.55 to 1 that property
damage will result. However, when two or more units are involved for a viola-
tion other than traffic, the odds are less than one (.62 to 1) that property damage
will result. The same inconsistency holds for reason of the pursuit.
Two of the three-way interactions with property damage were statistically
significant. The odds ratios for these interactions are presented in Tables 8 and 9.
The odds ratios for the interaction of time, reason, and speed with property
*   Table 7
Odds of Property Damage for the Interaction between Number of Units
and Reason for the Pursuit
Odds Ratio                                       Moderator                           Odds of Injury
Reason for Pursuit
Twoa versus one unit Traffic 1.55
Non-traffic 0.62
Units
Non-traffic versus traffic One 1.63
Two 0.66
a Two or more units
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damage also show no clear pattern. In some cases, pursuits at high speeds
are likely to result in property damage, whereas in other cases pursuits at
high speeds are less likely to result in such damage. Inspection of the data in
Table 9 also shows these inconsistencies. There are no clear patterns of prop-
erty damage for the interaction of time, reason, and area with property dam-
age. These results indicate that it is difficult to predict property damage based
on the pursuit characteristics in this study. This finding is bolstered by the
fact that there were no significant main effects for any of the pursuit charac-
teristics in relation to property damage.
*   Table 8
Odds of Property Damage for the Interaction Among Speed of the
Pursuit, Reason for the Pursuit, and Light Conditions
                                                                                                                   Odds of
Odds Ratio                     Moderators  Property Damage
Reason Light Conditions





Non-traffic Day Slow 1.25




Night versus day Traffic Slow 1.22
Traffic Fast  NA
Non-traffic Slow 0.91
Non-traffic Fast 0.35
aSpeeds in excess of 65 mph
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*   Table 9
Odds of Property Damage for the Interaction Among Speed of the
Pursuit, Reason for the Pursuit, and Area of the Pursuit
* Discussion and Conclusions
The information generated from this research represents a case study and there-
fore generalizations to other law enforcement agencies must be made with cau-
tion. The factors influencing the cost of a pursuit in the Miami-Dade Police
Department may be different from those in other agencies. However, the results
of the research do provide important information for other agencies and re-
searchers to consider when evaluating their pursuits. Future studies can enhance
the development of a pursuit calculus by improving certain areas. First, the speci-
fication and collection of data elements must be clear and unambiguous. Our
                                                                                                               Odds of
Odds Ratio                     Moderators  Property Damage
Reason Light Conditions
Commercial verses Traffic Day 1.34




Non-traffic Commercial Day 0.87








aSpeeds in excess of 65 mph
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measures of property damage and personal injury are dichotomous (yes or no)
and do not indicate level or extent. Second, the importance of specific factors
may vary according to jurisdiction. The pursuit characteristics used in the present
research create a base from which other agencies can add or remove pursuit
environmental factors to be studied.
In the case of the Miami-Dade Police Department, the number of units, area
of pursuits, and speeds have a direct effect on the likelihood of a pursuit result-
ing in a personal injury. When more than one police vehicle is involved in a
pursuit, the additional units increase the likelihood of an injury. Conventional
wisdom and other policy considerations suggest that more than one unit is nec-
essary for officer protection or even survival, although there are no data that
confirm this for pursuit applications.
Once a data-driven pursuit calculus is computed, the results must be trans-
lated into policy, training, and supervision directives. That is, the more manage-
ment knows about its pursuits, the better it can design a plan to maximize ben-
efits and minimize costs. The obvious response to many concerns is to train
officers and supervisors about the costs and benefits of the pursuit elements.
Too often, officers and supervisors are unaware of the ratio of benefits to costs
or are told all pursuits are unique and must be evaluated individually.
In general, when pursuits involve more than one unit, are in a commercial
rather than a residential area, and increase in speed to greater than 65 mph, the
odds of injury increase dramatically. However, these main effects are moderated
by the interaction of other pursuit characteristics.
When the interaction of the factors is considered, as shown in Tables 5 and
6, some pursuits should clearly be avoided. The analysis for property damage
was not as conclusive. The factors had no effect on the likelihood of property
damage and the interactions show no clear patterns. An outcome of property
damage is certainly less predictable than an outcome of personal injury in the
present study.
When suspects fail to respond to a police officer’s order to stop, they create
a risk to the public by acting irrationally, and illegally. The police officer must
respond and maintain public safety. In some cases, when the interaction of fac-
tors increases the costs of a pursuit above its benefits, the police officer’s best
tool is to shut off the emergency equipment, slow down, let the suspect flee, and
try to apprehend him or her through low-risk investigative techniques rather
than a high-risk pursuit.
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